The February 5 joint event of Kashmir centric jehadis and HAMAS at a Rawalakot stadium in Pakistan administered Kashmir, sheds light on a new strategy of the jehadis backed by Pakistan. If one were to state one clear goal of the radical extremism here – it would be to take Kashmir away from India. But what with India emerging quickly as an economic and military power to reckon with, a curious interplay of strategic interests and dangerous liaisons is on. An analysis from Kashmir Central.
NOTWITHSTANDING the strange contradictions and paradoxes, there is an attempt by the radical Jehadis in Pakistan to set a common theme with the HAMAS arguing that both Palestine and Kashmir were subjects of pan-Islamic jehad. The February 5 joint event of Kashmir centric Jehadis and HAMAS at a Rawalakot stadium in Pakistan administered Kashmir explicitly sheds light on the new strategy of the jehadis backed by deep state of Pakistan.
Despite inherent contradictions in their thinking and practices, their seemingly reactionary goals and the apparently modern means they use, it looks like the idea has got some sort of traction, not least in the minds of indoctrinated Salafist disciples in the recruiting camps of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)- the main terror outfits engaged in Kashmir. Hizbul Mujahideen, once considered the only indigenous terrorist outfit, is already floundering on the margins and on the other hand, is trying hard to stay relevant and for that, the terrorist organisation is working on a project which we will discuss a little later.
February 5 is being observed by the Pakistani establishment as the ‘Kashmir Solidarity Day’. The precedent was set by Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan in 1990 following the inception of the armed militancy in Kashmir. There were two main highlights of the ‘Kashmir Solidarity Day’ this year; one, the HAMAS which is engaged in war with, Israel was seen rubbing shoulders with the JeM, LeT and HM commanders on the same platform at the Shaheed Shabir Stadium in Rawalakot Stadium in Pakistan administered Kashmir. Two; the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan simultaneously organised a rally in Karachi to woe support for the “Kashmir Jehad”.
The first event at Rawalakot marks the fundamental shift in the strategy of terrorists operating in Kashmir on one hand, while on the other hand, the event marked the end of leadership role of Hizbul Mujahideen in “Kashmir Jehad”. It was not merely an event of a tradition; rather it marked departure from the tradition itself. The event was titled ‘Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation ‘Al Aqsa Flood’ Conference’.
Al Qaeda and Taliban – the deadliest Jehadist organisations over the last one decade or so – have been meddling in the “Kashmir Jehad”, though symbolically. Both see Kashmir as a “future project”. And both Al-Qaeda and Taliban are very important organs of the pan Islamic Jehad, at least ideologically, and both had some kind of understanding with the ISIS or ISIL in the past. HAMAS, however, was limited to the Middle East, particularly fighting for the cause of Palestine. That said, the HAMAS derives its theological strength from the 20th century ideologue Sayyid Qutb who introduced Takfirism to the transnational ensemble of jehadis.
The latest development of HAMAS leadership rubbing shoulders with the Pakistani jehadists can be interpreted in more than one ways. The HAMAS leaders who attended the February event are of Irani origin. Dr Khalid Qadoumi, Dr Naji Zaheer – both come from Iran. Mufti Azam and Bilal al Sanat come from Palestine. Though the Government of India enjoys a good relationship with Iran, the electronic media in New Delhi is driving a particular narrative not seen in consonance with the New Delhi’s official Iran policy. Secondly, the same news channels, as alleged by some journalists in Middle-East, justify Israeli actions in Gaza thereby annoying the HAMAS and the people of the Middle East. In that sense, HAMAS coming to Pakistan Administered Kashmir is purely reactionary.
Secondly, I have been arguing since long that we are currently living in a decentralised and disarrayed world wherein people tend to disregard the international laws rather than adhering to them. There is no fear of reprisal or reprimand. This kind of geo-politics has really emboldened Pakistan so much so that the country openly invites the global jehadis to its soil calling for pan Islamic jehad on Kashmir. The policy planners in Pakistan are more than contented to make that country a melting pot of violent ideas. We have discussed earlier that the security dilemma actually forces Pakistan to go for misadventures. Therefore there are attempts to synthesise the violent ideology and create some kind of deterrent -the lethal one- to the anticipated threat (based on the doctrine of offensive defence) from India. According to some reports, the conversion of HAMAS and Pakistani jehadis at an event discussed at length the “defensive” and “offensive” jehad and the legitimacy of targeting unarmed civilians.
Third; in Bashar al Assad’s coup in Syria and the Talibanisation of Afghanistan earlier have given a sense of purpose and an idea how they could achieve their aims to the jehadis. Taking a cue from what has “worked”, they called for action in the guise of renewed jehad against India in Kashmir. There is a pattern in the fall regimes in the Middle East. Interestingly, the regimes fell – after they successfully quilled the deadliest armed uprisings. In dramatic events, the regimes fall to the radical groups without offering any resistance. Whatever the reason, this is exactly what the theological concept of the radicals is. This has really infused fresh blood in jehadis, globally.
Fourth; the jehadis, according to some unconfirmed reports, have decided to engage with the religious leaders of Pakistan prevailing upon them to call for pan Islamic jehad on Kashmir. The meeting of Dr. Khalid Qadoumi with Maulana Fazlul Haq and some secret meeting with Jamaat-e-Islami leadership in an attempt to re-engage with them is a clear indication that the JeM and the LeT top commanders who have been very critical of the religious leaders outside their sect, have finally yielded to the larger game-plan of engaging the religious leaders beyond Salafists or Wahhabis. The JeM and LeT, of late, have realised that human resource could not be limited to their respective madrasas if they really wanted to scale up the jehad in Kashmir and beyond.
The religious organisations, since 2019, had greatly scaled down their anti-India narrative and the Pakistani army too was busy managing their own house in wake of the public upsurge following the dismissal of Imran Khan and the subsequent public outrage against the army. JeM and LeT were anticipating Afghan war lords to join them in large numbers following Talibanisation of that country; however, that didn’t happen. Furthermore, jehadis in Pakistan are struggling hard to renew the Pakistani narrative in Kashmir beyond terrorism. Since 2019, they have been finding it very hard to have moles in mainstream religious organisations in Kashmir. The political and ideological support base for the Pakistani narrative in Kashmir has, to a greater extent, fizzled out, as Pakistan is completely missing in the discourse in Kashmir since the last three-four years.
The political leadership is languishing in jails on charges of terror funding and money-laundering. And the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir has, as a tactical retreat, established contacts with the Narendra Modi government for lifting of ban on its activities. The Jamaat has been the most trusted ally of jehad in Kashmir, providing it theological and intellectual input. Shunning the anti-India narrative as a tactic is seen as a setback to the jehadi elements in Pakistan. There is zero mobilisation of people on ground since 2019.
Five – Hamas’s participation in a Pakistan-backed conference signals its desire of expansion beyond the Middle East. HAMAS actually wants to build on the sympathy it has earned during the recent Gaza war where Israel is being accused of carrying out genocide. The Muslim world is very aghast with the Israeli action in Gaza and has sympathies with the HAMAS fighting a lone wolf battle against Israel. HAMAS is actually looking for more recruitments from this part of the world. Its influence and growing links with Pakistan-based terror outfits is based on give-and-take formula. It would certainly help Pakistan jehadis to make Kashmir a pan Islamic project. In return it would certainly be looking for human resource from the region to fight Israel.
Six; inviting HAMAS to Pakistan could also be seen as an attempt to blackmail the Trump administration. Pakistan is already on the brink of economic collision reeling with sectarian clashes and faces mass uprising in Balochistan. The country is facing immense problems on many fronts. Pakistan believes that India is meddling in her internal matters in Gilgit, Baltistan, Muzaffarabad and Balochistan having serious implications on the security and stability of Pakistan. And Trump on the other hand, is showing least interest in Pakistan. Bringing HAMAS to PAK could help them in dragging Trump administration to mediate with India with some bargaining power.
Coming to Hizbul Mujahideen which was once considered the only indigenous group with a strong support base in Kashmir, has suffered a huge setback both physically and morally during last seven-eight years. The presence of Hizbul Mujahideen cadres at the Rawalakot event is something very insignificant for the fact that not only in Kashmir, the organisation has lost its leadership role in Pakistan also. The reason being – the Hizbul Mujahideen has not been able to attract fresh recruits from Kashmir for so long. Literally, Hizbul is only on papers now. Again this has two reasons – the growing influence of Pan Islamic jehadis on the horizon and the Jamaat-e-Islami suspending its pro jehad activities for the time being.
In a desperate attempt to revive, Hizbul has asked all those Kashmiris who went to Pakistan for arms training in early phase of the Kashmir militancy but settled there with families, now to join back or face the consequences. On the other hand, the Hizbul is very seriously considering its earlier policy of targeting civilians in Kashmir to stay relevant and spread fear among what it was known for earlier.
It looks like Hizbul will force the Kashmiris (called muhajirs in PAK) join the cadres in the coming months. However, in mobilising the muhajirs, Hizbul faces a strange dilemma. Even if the muhajiris were to become active, it is unlikely that they will join Hizbul for the fact that it is JeM and LeT who can incentivise them. Hizbul, as of now, has not that many resources. As discussed in detail in an earlier issue, those kin of Kashmiris join LeT or JeM for higher incentives who have families in PAK or any other part of Pakistan. On the other hand, the vulnerable section of the youth locally in Kashmir don’t think Hizbul as viable option any more for the same reasons. The Pakistani establishment, as said earlier, is more into making Kashmir a pan Islamic project rather than keeping it local. The emerging geo-political combinations and permutations have actually encouraged Pakistan to do so. Under the given scenario, Hizbul seems to be least relevant for Pakistan. That said, it is very unlikely that Pakistan would abandon Hizbul completely. Pakistan would like to keep Hizbul alive, empowering it to create fear among the locals in Kashmir and well, Hizbul is indeed appropriate for the job.
To conclude, today’s radical extremism with reference to Kashmir is filled with strange contradictions and paradoxes. If it would have one explicitly stated goal, it would be to take Kashmir away from India. This looks very odd for a number of reasons. One reason that strikes the most is the imbalance of power in the region. India is emerging very fast on the global map as an economic and military power to reckon with. There is something more than meets the eye. There is interplay of strategic interests. To me what Pakistan is to China, Kashmir is to Pakistan. As detailed in the security dilemma analysis in an earlier KC edition, the problem lies somewhere else, but the stakeholders try to fix it elsewhere.
