BASHIR ASSAD
The renewed cross border terrorism in Jammu province of the Himalayan region of Jammu and Kashmir poses a great threat to the national security of the country, given the intent and capability of the enemy to threaten the fundamental goals and interests of the Indian nation.
The Indian armed forces have been dealing with the challenge of cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir for three decades. However, as elaborated in the previous edition of the Kashmir Central, the renewed phase of terrorism is unique in so many ways and as such the armed forces need to devise a comprehensive response based on critical thinking more than anything else.
Though there are statements coming from the Army hierarchy about the enhanced operational capability to deal with the terrorism particularly in Jammu region, the strategists need to go beyond the conventional outlook. Unique challenges need unique responses beyond the conventional approach. The unique response cannot be possible without critical brainstorming. The strategists in the Indian armed forces need to ask very uncomfortable questions in order to provide solutions to the new challenges which are enormous from the security point of view.
According to a senior army officer, the Indian army has significantly enhanced its operational capabilities in recent times in the terrains of Jammu forests. This includes strengthening patrols and posts in the difficult terrains and ridges. Recently GOC White Knight Corps Lieutenant General Navin Sachdeva said that helicopters, UAVs and several types of sensors are being used as part of technology to maintain vigil along Line of Control (LOC). This can suffice as the initial operational preparedness or capability. The response to the emerging threat from cross-border terrorism must be comprehensive.
The Phase of Highly Trained, Lethal Terrorists
The plan of action needs to be formulated as a response to the evolving threat posed by the infiltration of highly trained terrorists carrying lethal weapons. The doctrine at play emphasizes on protecting and safeguarding the interests of the Indian state. In military terminology, it is a response to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country.
The military strategists and policy planners primarily focus on safeguarding the borders and eliminating the threat from within posed by the infiltration of the terrorists. It is called task definition.
The policy planners define the task based on evaluation of the situation on ground. Hence, we can argue that the strategists are responsive rather than futuristic. In other words, the plan of action is the plan of retaliation and response.
There could be counter arguments that the Indian defence mechanism has evolved over the years. Operation Balakot, or for that matter the killing of hardcore terrorist commanders deep inside Pakistani territory cannot be categorised as retaliation or response. We have very eloquently addressed this issue in the previous edition. This is the outcome of the security dilemma. Safeguarding the interests or territorial integrity explicitly reflects on the operational capabilities of the Indian army.
Not Just Safeguard: Need to Further The Interests of the State
At the same time, the narrative of “safeguarding” has negative connotations as well. It is a state of stagnation as against the narrative of “furthering” the interests of the state. By that account the Indian army is yet to enhance its military capabilities in terms of technology and training and human resource.
No doubt India has started modernization of its military. But in some quarters, it is felt that our armed forces are still decades behind the powerful militaries of the world. There are around 70 parameters that determine military power. All those parameters culminate at furthering the interests of the state, making it clear that you are a military power to reckon with.
What takes you to the advanced stage is the Information and Communication technology, critical and creative thinking, synthesis, evaluation. Disruptive technologies such as advanced sensors, data analytics, and artificial intelligence improve military’s situational awareness, enabling commanders to make informed decisions in real-time and adapt to dynamic battlefield conditions. To that extent, the Indian Army has achieved significant milestones.
However, as emphasized earlier, the military power is not determined by the situational awareness and the response thereof. Any assessment of parity between the Indian army and the most powerful military powers the US, China and Russia is not just a question of military power. The parity must also be studied in terms of the capability to respond to the given challenges.
Fundamental Reforms Needed
Some fundamental reforms are pivotal towards becoming a military power to reckon with.
- Education: The academic education (not post recruitment education) is very important for the holistic growth of an individual. There are two aspects of knowledge as far as the Indian army is concerned.
- Expert knowledge or Training refers to skill development, attitudes and job behaviour, required for efficiency and effectiveness in the work field and the Indian army officers are excellent at it.
- Academic excellence refers to the inclusive knowledge to develop a well-conversant, competent, progressed and responsible citizen. Education in the Indian Army needs overhauling as there are many deficiencies in the system.
- Reforms in training: As India is a land of diverse cultures, languages, tribes, ethnicities, regions, religions, the soldiers must be conditioned through workshops, symposiums, seminars or crash courses to adapt to the environment of the area where he or she is performing the duties.
Training is only one of the elements of education. Education brings complete improvement of personality of an individual, necessary for his personal development in the long term. Training, on the other side, develops skills, attitudes and job behaviour, vital for efficiency and effectiveness in the profession. The Indian Army should not be simply seen as an employment generating organization for the unemployed undereducated youth. This mindset needs to be changed.
If you really want to compete with the most powerful armies of the world, education of soldiers is the fundamental requirement. Indian army could be the most disciplined army in the world courtesy rigorous training. However, the intellectual and logical quotients are very poor among the soldiers as well as the officers. Education alone brings about comprehensive transformation and enhances an individual’s worldview enormously. Training on the other side is about skills and job behaviour, fitness and so on and so forth.
The institution of the Indian army in its entirety must be a knowledge hub, rather than an institution of the knowledgeable. Education or knowledge alone could foster a culture of transformation while ranks and files could be ready to adapt to the changing scenarios.
As of now the training courses of the army officers are designed for tactical and administrative capability for different operations of war. In other words, the officers gain expertise not education. Structural changes in the system are required to change the outlook and enhance the worldview. The powerful armies are not powerful because of the skills but essentially because of the knowledge. Military plays a very important role in nation building. The Army is not just about making the soldiers battle ready. We need to move to the advanced stage of nation building referred above in order to further the interests of the state, which is not possible unless the institution of the Indian army emerges as a knowledge hub.
This must be an altogether different course from the operant conditioning. It would certainly help the soldiers in more than two ways: flow of information from the locals and acceptability even in a hostile atmosphere. The behavioural transformation is something which earns loreals even from the perceived enemies. This is something which the Indian army and the policy planners should think of particularly, when there are a host of political and geographical conflicts within the country, and the army is engaged in counter-insurgency operations.
In general terminology we call it connecting with the local populace. The connection must improve. The perception of the people where you operate matters the most. If you are seen as a friend and saviour, you win. And if the perception among the masses where you operate is that of an enemy, you lose even if you are in a dominating position.
The Early Errors in Kashmir, Their Costs
Coming back to the cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, why has it been sustained for so long, draining national resources to unimaginable levels? Having a cursory look at the anti-insurgency project since the inception of armed terrorism in Kashmir, we come across the flaws and lacunas which went to the advantage of the enemy in Kashmir.
We started the anti-insurgency project believing that everyone is guilty unless proven otherwise. Though quick evaluation led to the change in thought processes, damage was done. More enemies were created than friends. After 2002, the Army changed its behaviour completely. However, sporadic incidents would wash away whatever good will was earned at the cost of huge material and human resources.
Thereafter, every effort was made by the Indian army to humanize its operations which resulted in almost wiping out terrorism from Jammu and Kashmir by 2008.
The enemy thereafter changed its tactics. Rather than focussing on armed terrorism, it provoked mass mobilizations by fuelling the emotions of the vulnerable youth. This mass mobilization glamorized the terrorism and finally culminated in revival of glamourized terrorism. We have witnessed three phases of terrorism in Kashmir. Adventure terrorism from 1989 to 1995, ideological extremism from 1995 to 2002 and glamorized terrorism from 2010 to 2018. Currently we are in the grip of hardcore lethal terrorism.
Damages Caused by Political Polarization
The political polarization has somehow pushed a community to the margins in Jammu region due to which the flow of information has suffered greatly. Though the Indian Army is trying very hard to build a relationship of mutual trust with the local population in south of Pirpanjal and in Chenab valley sub-regions, the political narratives didn’t allow the locals to walk extra-mile.
GOC White Knight Corps, talking of a cordial relationship with the locals during his recent visit to Rajouri, spoke obliquely of the damages caused by political polarization. I have maintained consistently in my conversations with the Army hierarchy that the consequences of polarized political narratives are on jawan and awaam (soldier and common man).
You cannot win the war – essentially the proxy war – without the support and involvement of the local populace
Regaining the trust of the locals and rebuilding their faith in the system by the Indian army could be the differentiating factor in the Army’s operational capability and preparedness. You cannot win the war – essentially the proxy war – without the support and involvement of the local populace. That is precisely why there is emphasis on knowledge and education of the soldiers and officers. We have seen officers walking an extra mile without compromising on the basic premises of security, not only eliminating the terrorists but simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the locals. That is what is required right now.
