The Himalayan region of Jammu and Kashmir is witnessing a gradual and what could be termed as a meticulously planned hike in militancy activities, heightening concerns among the security agencies and policy planners.
The theatre, as envisaged by this scribe in earlier editions of the Kashmir Central, is gradually expanding, signaling a dramatic turn of events in the foreseeable future. The surge in militant attacks in Kashmir valley since last one month and the continued assaults by highly trained terrorists in Jammu region represent a significant shift from the tactics used earlier. The frequency of terrorist strikes, involving precision and meticulous strategic planning, poses unprecedented challenges to the security managers.
Hardcore Terrorists, Technological Sophistication
As elaborated in our earlier edition, this is completely a new phase of terrorism with two significant distinctions from the past phases. One, technological sophistication and high-tech weaponry including use of US made M4 assault rifles and steel-cased bullets. Second, highly trained hardcore terrorists.
The terrorist attacks have never been so intense and damaging. The attacks in the last one year or so in densely forested rugged terrains of Jammu region followed by same swiftness in south and north Kashmir inflicted heavy casualties on the security forces.
I have been constantly maintaining that the current phase of Kashmir terrorism could be more encompassing and highly damaging at least from a security perspective. There is a clear pattern, militant strikes are abrupt and surprising. Strategy is not to come down to the plains but instead engage the security forces in high altitudes with difficult terrains.
The same game plan seems to be in vogue in Kashmir valley now. It is very clear now that terrorists pursue a well-thought-out strategy – occasionally come down, hit the target and move back to the forested areas. Their objective seems to be to provoke the army and security forces to chase, and then they strike back from an advantageous position. This is what we are witnessing in the mountainous areas of Jammu region, and this is precisely how the terrorists have started operating in Kashmir division.
Given the rigorous training of survival in extreme climatic conditions, it is very unlikely that the terrorists who have infiltrated and are roaming in hilly terrains both in Jammu and Kashmir regions would come down to the plains during the winters.
Higher Number of Foreign Terrorists
The number of terrorists has swelled much beyond what the official figures suggest. According to police sources, the number of foreign terrorists in North Kashmir’s Kupwara, Baramulla and Bandipora districts alone could be more than 60 while the number of terrorists roaming in Central Kashmir’s mountains could be more than 20.
South Kashmir’s Shopian, Kulgam and Anantnag higher reaches serve as transit routes, and hence there is no specific information regarding the static number of terrorists in the area. Higher reaches of Shopian and Kulgam are used as a passage to and from Poonch, Rajouri and Reasi. Anantnag’s Shangus and Kokernag forests connect Kashmir with Kishtwar, Doda and further to Kathua district bordering Pakistan.
There are some foreign terrorists in the hinterland tasked with the mobilization of local youth. They are few in numbers and are engaged in local recruitment and in providing logistics to terrorists in hilly areas. According to police sources, these terrorists are good at indoctrinating local youths.
Higher Number of Local Militants
Coming to the home-grown militants, the number has significantly gone up during the last two years. There are no concrete official figures regarding the exact number of the locals joining the armed militant groups.
Handlers from across the border are managing the local militants with utmost care, in order to ensure that they are not exposed or made vulnerable to detection by security forces. Online recruitment is meticulously planned using end to end encrypted applications, making it very difficult for the security and intelligence agencies to track them down. It seems to be a part of the strategy that militants – both foreign and local recruits – have been asked to keep a low profile. The idea is to swell the number of local recruits without coming into the radar of the security and intelligence agencies.
This new phase of terrorism is marked by technological sophistication and high-tech weaponry, and highly trained hardcore terrorists.
Zero Impact on Public Life
In this new phase of terrorism in Kashmir, what marks a complete shift from the past is the complete lack of impact on public life. The new phase of terrorism is missing in public discourse in Kashmir. People are busy with their day-to-day activities. The businesses, education, horticulture and host of other activities are going on uninterrupted. There is almost a disconnect from the activities of the terrorists. It is difficult to come by anybody indulging in discussions or debates about the resurgence of militancy.
This is a very huge transformation. It seems that there is a resilience among people not to get bogged down by the renewed burst of terrorism. Armed forces are vigilant and take care that there should not be any collateral damages during encounters. It is evident that public opinion does not favour resurgence of terrorism in Kashmir.
Decoding The ‘Foreign’ Terrorists
There is a popular perception, particularly among the defense and strategic experts, that the terrorists who have infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir through various points from Line of Control to International border are mostly war veterans who have returned from Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from that country.
Experts argue that from the use of highly sophisticated weapons like US made M4 assault rifle and steel-cased bullets by the terrorists in recent attacks on security forces particularly in Jammu region, it is clear that terrorists who have infiltrated are Afghan war veterans. Security agencies also claim that there are regular Pakistan army personnel fighting alongside the foreign terrorists.
However, there is one more category of foreign terrorists. These are children of Kashmiris who had gone to Pakistan during the years of high militancy and settled down in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK).
Let us examine the numbers of foreign militants who were killed in Kashmir in the last few weeks.
Seven militants including five foreigners were killed in the first week of November in Kashmir valley. Two militants were killed in the Sopore encounter. Two local militants were killed in Shangus, Anantnag. A foreign LeT terrorist commander was killed in Srinagar’s Khanyar area, and a foreign terrorist was killed in Bandipora forests.
Another foreign terrorist was killed during an encounter in Lolab forest.
The terrorists killed in any shootout are designated as foreign terrorists if the police and security agencies cannot ascertain their identity locally. According to a senior police officer, “foreigners” does not essentially mean that they have come from Afghanistan or other nations. “We usually use the word “foreigner” for all those who have infiltrated from Pakistan through LoC or the internal border to our side,” said the police officer.
Second Generation Terrorists Being Pushed Into Kashmir
The senior cop said that we ignore the fact that in the 1990s, a large number of men from Poonch, Rajouri, Kupwara, Bandipora and other places in Jammu and Kashmir went to the other side of Kashmir, which is occupied by Pakistan. These men were either active militants and exfiltrated to escape the Indian security forces or were militant sympathisers and went for arms training. Most of them did not return. They married local girls and settled in POK and have families now.
All those who have settled in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or came to Pakistan from any of the neighbouring countries are categorized as refugees. They don’t have citizenship rights and could not get a Pakistani passport.
Many Pakistanis who want to build a good life migrate to the Gulf and other countries for livelihood. But the children of refugees cannot travel because they do not possess valid travel and citizenship documents.
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has a refugee management division. Because the refugee families are financially weak and don’t have resources, they desperately try to send their wards to the Gulf and other countries. They approach the refugee management division and strike a deal with the agency.
If somebody has three or four children, he volunteers to hand over one of the children to the refugee management division so that he can get passports for his other children. These volunteers are then handed over to Jaish e Muhammad seminaries for very rigorous jungle warfare training which continues for years.
According to the police officer, foreigners who have infiltrated in Kashmir in recent years are second-generation hardcore Jaish terrorists.
Presence of Terrorists Trained In Warfare
One more important observation is that at least four or five middle-aged men in their late 40s or 50s have been eliminated either while attempting to infiltrate or in the hinterland during anti-insurgency operations. A terrorist who was recently killed in Bandipora area was identified as Bilal, who was in his 50s. He had gone to Pakistan in 1990.
Another such incident took place in Reasi last year where a middle-aged exfiltrated militant was killed in an operation. Similarly, there were intelligence inputs last year that a couple of second-generation terrorists whose father hailed from a particular area of Anantnag district were spotted in some hilly area. Likewise, the two militants killed in Shangus encounter in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district are believed to be second-generation terrorists of Kashmiri origin.
Presence of Afghanistan war veterans in Kashmir cannot be ruled out. However, there is evidence regarding the presence of a significant number of second-generation terrorists who have infiltrated in the last couple of years.
The foreigners roaming in dense forest areas of Poonch and Rajouri districts can be second-generation terrorists. Genetically, men hailing from Poonch and the Rajwadis are good fighters, no less than the Afghanis. However, there could be more than meets the eye. The terrorists who have been involved in recent operations exhibited a high degree of precision and coordination. This has led security forces to believe that men of Pakistan Army could be operating alongside the second-generation terrorists.
The Surge Of Terrorism In Kashmir
What Explains It?
The emerging phase of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is highly dangerous, posing greater challenges to the security managers than ever before. There are many theories floated by strategic and defence experts for the spurt in terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir.
According to one section of defence experts, the revival of terrorism south of Pir Panjal owes to the reduction of troops in the region following Indo-China border skirmishes on eastern border in Ladakh and their redeployment along Indo-China border.
Many others argue that the operational space of terrorists was significantly reduced in Kashmir region because of the high concentration of the army and paramilitary troops. They reason that consequently, terrorists were forced to flee to the treacherous and densely forested terrains of Jammu region.
Some strategists and keen Kashmir watchers have recently observed that Kashmir does not provide safe haven for terrorists any more because the nexus between politicians and terrorists has been broken. I beg to differ with each one of these theories. My understanding is that there are many contributing factors, and the listed ones just have peripheral significance. In this article we try to analyse how, when and why the terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is witnessing such a huge surge.
The Security Dilemma – The ‘Offensive Defence’ Tactics of India and Pakistan
It is a universal phenomenon that immaterial of any explanations of action or retaliation, a state has the right to adopt security strategies to ensure its territorial sovereignty. The security endeavours by a state may imply that the security of its neighbours is not guaranteed.
To compensate for its compromised security, the adversary neighbouring state may feel threatened and may decide to adopt some corresponding security strategies. These counter-strategies may in turn challenge or compromise the security concerns of the first state. Both sides then enter a “security dilemma”.
We are witnessing this kind of ‘security dilemma’ in the Indian sub-continent. Both India and Pakistan are inconspicuously using the “offensive defence” tactics, which inevitably undermine the security of the respective nation-states.
India has been dealing with the terrorism pushed in by Pakistan for more than three decades. Many unpleasant events unfolded due to Pakistan’s involvement in high profile terrorist attacks in India during the last 30 years. After a series of attacks by Pakistan-based terror forces on India’s security installations and armed forces, the doctrine of offensive defence was invoked.
Now Pakistan is levelling allegations on India for aiding and abetting terrorism in Pakistan, fomenting public mobilization in Baluchistan and targeting the members of proscribed terrorist organizations inside Pakistan. The mistrust between the two countries has led to a volley of accusations and counter-accusations about each other’s intentions and actions. This in turn has amplified the persisting insecurities.
Pakistan’s perception of insecurity seems to stem from the size, security strength (economic and military) and the stature of the Indian state.
India’s concerns stem from a proven history of jehad and jingoism emanating from Pakistan, in addition to its jealousy and its stated doctrine of ‘bleeding India by a thousand cuts’.
Expansion Of Theatre Of Violence
The current phase of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is deeply linked with the amplified insecurities of the Pakistani state in the aftermath of the application of “offensive defence” doctrine by the Indian state. This indicates that the security dilemma between the two neighbouring states would intensify. The offensive by either side further deepens the mistrust, and hence the security dilemma.
The expansion of theatre beyond the valley of Kashmir up to the Kathua seems to be guided by the fear of the offensive defence doctrine. The supposed reduction of troops in Jammu region or the concentration of troops in Kashmir valley does not seem to be the factor here. The spurt in terrorism, I insist, only reflects the fear and anxieties that the Pakistan state has been reeling under since the last five or six years.
The current impasse is remotely related to the historical events which had been at the centre of strained relationship between India and Pakistan since the birth of the two independent nation-states. It is strongly linked to the corresponding security measures. The narrative remains the same as it was, but the spirit is altogether different – and hence the spiralling security dilemma.
Misplaced priorities of J&K Admn post Abrogation of Article 370
As a keen observer, I have been arguing with whatever resources at my command that majority people in Jammu and Kashmir – especially in Kashmir valley – have shunned the path of violence not essentially because of the abrogation of Article 370. They have stayed away from violence because there is the realization of the futility of self-inflicting street protests, agitations and the unending cycle of hartals.
There is no denying that post the abrogation of Article 370, the Jammu and Kashmir government tightened the noose around the terror ecosystem and blocked the channels of hawala funding. However, no one could deny the fact that the people had already changed their minds much earlier.
The 2016 agitation which engulfed the nook and corner of Kashmir valley in the aftermath of the killing of Burhan Wani, the poster boy of Kashmir militancy, was the turning point in Kashmir’s violent history. At the end of that violent agitation which consumed hundreds of Kashmiri youths and injured thousands more, people started realising the futility and fatality of violence.
There was this strong undercurrent that violence was self-damaging. It had brought death and destruction along the length and breadth of Kashmir valley without any net results or gains. From here started the downfall of the hawkish separatist leader Sayed Ali Geelani and disenchantment towards separatism was increasingly evident.
I have been arguing that it was not because of the stringent security measures alone that Kashmir remained calm post abrogation of Article 370. There were even more stringent and massive security measures put in place during the violent protests of 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012. Despite those measures, youths challenged the security grid, came out in large numbers and engaged in deadly street battles with the security forces.
After 2010, elaborate security measures helped the state enormously, but the instrumental factor which ensured peace was the self-realization of the futility of the violence. Based on this understanding, I keep arguing that Kashmir shall never ever go back to violent protests.
Many analysts in the UT Administration and also in J&K Police did not read these dynamics in terms of the huge shift in people’s attitudes. They attributed the calmness in the streets of Kashmir to the “coercive” law and order measures post abrogation of Article 370.
‘Collective Punishment’ Breeding Resentment
It may be argued that the coercion aggrieved the larger majority of Kashmiris. This could be the subject of an extensive and deep analysis. I strongly believe that the abrogation of Article 370 and the reorganization of the erstwhile state into two union territories on August 5, 2019, was less annoying for the people of Kashmir valley as compared to the policies of what is being termed as “collective punishment” post abrogation.
For a section of the bureaucracy, the abrogation of Article 370 meant complete suspension of civil liberties and democratic rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For these bureaucrats, every single person was guilty unless proven otherwise. This may be regarded as a strong statement but was true for a section of officers.
Let us now view the August 5, 2019, events from the commoner’s perspective. The abrogation of Article 370 or Article 35 A had very little or no meaning at all for the common masses. They did not celebrate the abrogation, but they did not mourn it either.
In fact, the average Kashmiri was happy that the political elites on both sides of the ideological divide would no longer be in a position to exploit or blackmail the poor. I also believe that had the entire bureaucracy worked towards taking the people on board through transparent, efficient and accountable governance, the situation would have been far better than it is.
There are two important turning points in recent Kashmir history. One is the transition from violence to non-violence post Burhan Wani agitation. The second shift came after the abrogation of Article 370. People regarded the abrogation of Article 370 as fait accompli – something that has happened and cannot be changed. But people felt highly insecure after a brief period of acceptance of the decision of abrogation of Article 370.
There was a degree of what could be termed as manageable cynicism. What followed, however, was annoying for the common masses. The perception of collective punishment among the public, particularly the aggrieved section of the youth, turned the situation upside down. As of now, the government seems to have no idea about the numbers of the local youths who have joined militant groups in recent times. But aggrieved by what they regarded as the policy of “collective punishment”, it looks like a significant number of local youths are back in militant ranks.
Security Management Must invest in Political Narrative
In the 35 years history of violent terrorism in Kashmir, it is fair to say that the political system would formulate action plans on inputs received from the security agencies. We have seen the political establishment defending the actions of the armed forces and building a narrative based on the policy inputs from the security and intelligence agencies. However, since the last five or six years, it looks like the security managers are more into propagating the political narrative. The reversal of roles, I am afraid, has to some extent defocused the security paradigm. The security management should focus on advising the government on crucial matters of territorial sovereignty, defense mechanism, warfare and much more.
We have been witnessing a strange churning in Jammu and Kashmir. Over the last two or three years, a section of the officialdom has been promoting and propagating a political narrative in what could be termed as dereliction of its duties. These officers devoted themselves to managing the politics in Jammu and Kashmir. The result is that human int has dried up and people are not ready to volunteer, as they used to in the past.
It was only because of the cooperation of the locals that the security forces were able to gain the upper hand over terrorism. Among security forces, Jammu and Kashmir Police was the biggest stakeholder not only because of its manpower but essentially because it could generate information from the public not through coercive measures but by being people friendly.
But this synergy seems to be lost now. Suddenly we are in a situation now where the recurrence of the hydra headed monster of terrorism falsifies the claims of peace and normalcy.
The abrogation of Article 370 or Article 35 A had very little or no meaning at all for the common masses. They did not celebrate the abrogation, but they did not mourn it either
China’s Policy Shift
Attempts To Be A Stakeholder
China’s position on the Kashmir conflict has been a subject of debate for the last many years. Arguably China has moved from neutrality to making attempts for the position of a stakeholder.
Over the last one decade, China has gradually moved from being a neutral neighbour to one showing interest in mediation between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. It seems that China has developed military and economic stakes in the Kashmir conflict.
Historically, China is in possession of parts of the erstwhile region of Jammu and Kashmir, but it never muddled into the affairs as brazenly as it has since the last one decade or so.
The change in China’s stand on Kashmir is attributed to the growing mutual interests of Pakistan and China. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, launched in 2015, has significantly changed the nature of China’s involvement in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
China’s involvement in encouraging a fresh wave of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir cannot be ruled out
In the wake of the decision of abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and the reorganization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 by the Indian Parliament, China’s Kashmir policy further drifted away from its traditional line. References to the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir re-emerged in China’s public statements. Beijing took diplomatic actions to support Pakistan’s bid to internationalize the Kashmir issue. As a result, China’s Kashmir policy has been turning into a serious source of friction in Sino–Indian relations.
Pakistan, rather than looking towards the West, has strategically opted for China. Without going into the details of the history and historical events that shaped the strategic partnership of China and Pakistan, or China’s intention of monopolization of South and South-West Asia, China is presently much into the game of Kashmir. Border skirmishes and in certain cases aggressions for altering the eastern borders are strategic moves by China to bolster its claims of being an equal stakeholder on Kashmir. Therefore, China’s involvement in encouraging a fresh wave of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir cannot be ruled out.
